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Abstract
3D object classification and segmentation using deep
neural networks has been extremely successful. As the prob-
lem of identifying 3D objects has many safety-critical appli-
cations, the neural networks have to be robust against ad-
versarial changes to the input data set. There is a growing
body of research on generating human-imperceptible adver-
sarial attacks and defenses against them in the 2D image
classification domain. However, 3D objects have various
differences with 2D images, and this specific domain has
not been rigorously studied so far.
We present a preliminary evaluation of adversarial at-
tacks on deep 3D point cloud classifiers, namely PointNet
and PointNet++, by evaluating both white-box and black-
box adversarial attacks that were proposed for 2D images
and extending those attacks to reduce the perceptibility of
the perturbations in 3D space. We also show the high effec-
tiveness of simple defenses against those attacks by propos-
ing new defenses that exploit the unique structure of 3D
point clouds. Finally, we attempt to explain the effectiveness
of the defenses through the intrinsic structures of both the
point clouds and the neural network architectures. Overall,
we find that networks that process 3D point cloud data are
weak to adversarial attacks, but they are also more easily
defensible compared to 2D image classifiers. Our inves-
tigation will provide the groundwork for future studies on
improving the robustness of deep neural networks that han-
dle 3D data.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in 3D deep learning have made strides
in tasks previously established by 2D baselines such as clas-
sification [17], segmentation [21], and detection [16]. How-
ever, 3D deep learning literature also lags behind its 2D
counterpart on tasks that seek to better understand behavior
of deep neural networks such as network interpretation [26],
few-shot learning [10], and robustness to adversarial exam-
ples [7]. We provide a preliminary investigation into how
deep 3D neural networks behave by examining its behavior
on simple adversarial attacks that are extremely effective on
2D images. We focus on examining networks, like Point-
Net [17] and PointNet++ [18], that process the lightweight
point cloud representation of 3D objects.
Robustness against adversarial attacks has been subject
to rigorous research due to its security implications in deep
learning systems. Deep neural networks that process 2D
images were shown to be extremely vulnerable against sim-
ple adversarial perturbations [7]. Furthermore, many pro-
posed defense methods have been foiled by adversarial at-
tacks, which indicates the difficulty of the challenge posed
by adversarial attacks [3]. These attacks are imperceptible
to humans, yet extremely effective in fooling neural net-
works. Attacks were also shown to be effectively transfer-
able across different neural networks [9] in black-box at-
tacks (as opposed to white-box attacks, where the adversary
has the model and its trained parameters).
We seek to advance studies in both 3D shape classifica-
tion and adversarial robustness by examining the behavior
of deep learning on point clouds in an adversarial setting.
We evaluate the PointNet [17] and PointNet++ [18] frame-
works that apply shared multi-layer perceptrons on each
point before using a global max-pooling layer across all the
points to obtain a global feature vector of the entire shape.
In this paper, we achieve the following:
• We show that various white-box and black-box adver-
sarial attacks are effective on undefended point cloud
classifiers.
• We show that simple defenses are effective against the
white-box adversarial attacks.
• We discuss potential reasons behind the effectiveness
of the defenses, including both intrinsic properties of
the point clouds and the neural networks.
We adapt adversarial attacks and defenses for 3D point
clouds, and we find that deep 3D point cloud classifiers,
while susceptible to simple adversarial attacks, are also
more easily defended than its 2D counterparts.
1
2. Related works
2.1. Adversarial examples
There have been a lot of research on both generating and
defending against adversarial attacks. Attacks on convo-
lutional neural networks for 2D image classification is the
most popular, with [19] first introducing an optimization-
based attack, and Goodfellow et al. [7] proposing a simple
and efficient fast gradient sign method (FGSM) for generat-
ing adversarial attacks constrained by the L∞ norm. Exten-
sions to the fast gradient sign method include running it for
multiple iterations [8] and using momentum [6]. Other ef-
fective attacks include the Jacobian-based saliency map at-
tack (JSMA) [14], DeepFool [13], and the Carlini-Wagner
attack [4].
The effectiveness of adversarial attacks has also been ex-
amined in other domains. [2] proposed an optimization-
based attack against malware detection. [1] evaluated ad-
versarial attacks on 2D image segmentation. Only very re-
cently has there been work on examining adversarial point
clouds [23, 27, 25].
There has been many techniques proposed for defense,
including adversarial training [7] and defensive distilla-
tion [15].
2.2. 3D deep learning
3D shape classification has been studied for various
representations of 3D objects: point clouds [5, 18, 17],
meshes [24], and voxels [20].
3. White-box adversarial attacks
As a preliminary investigation on the robustness of 3D
deep neural networks to adversarial examples, we explore
both targeted (i.e., misclassify to a specific class) and untar-
geted (i.e., misclassify to any class other than correct label)
adversarial attacks.
3.1. Fast gradient method
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) introduced by
Goodfellow et al. [7] generates adversarial examples for a
deep neural network f (that is parameterized by θ and takes
an input x) by increasing its cross entropy loss J between
the network’s output and the label y while constraining the
L∞ norm of the perturbation of x:
xadv = x+ ǫ sign(∆xJ(f(x; θ), y)) (1)
The ǫ value is an adjustable hyperparameter that dictates
the L∞ norm between the original input and the adversarial
example (i.e., ||xadv − x||∞ ≤ ǫ). For targeted attacks,
the sign of the gradient is subtracted instead of added to the
original sample.
3.2. Iterative gradient method
The iterative fast gradient method [8] improves the fast
gradient attack by repeating it multiple times to get a bet-
ter estimate of the loss surface wrt to the input of the net-
work. The algorithm for crafting an adversarial example
constrained by the L∞ norm can be expressed as
xadv
0
= x
xadvt = x
adv
t−1 + ǫ sign(∆xadv
t−1
J(f(xadvt−1; θ), y))
(2)
3.3. Modifying the fast/iterative gradient method
We expand Goodfellow et al.’s [7] idea to several related
categories of attacks. All of these cases constrain the mag-
nitude of the perturbation onto the surface of an epsilon ball,
but in different dimensions.
• Constraining the L2 norm of the perturbation for each
dimension of each point. This is just Goodfellow et
al.’s FGSM [7]. It restricts each dimension’s perturba-
tion onto the surface of an 1D epsilon ball by using the
sign operation on all the points.
• Constraining the L2 norm of the perturbation for each
point. We do this by normalizing all 3 dimensions of
each point’s perturbation by its L2 norm. This con-
strains the perturbation for each point onto the surface
of a 3D epsilon ball, allowing it to be in any arbitrary
direction. We refer to this as the ”normalized gradient
L2 method”. Each point p ∈ x is perturbed with the
following equation:
padv = p+ ǫ
∆pJ(f(x; θ), y)
||∆pJ(f(x; θ), y)||2
(3)
• Constraining the L2 norm between the entire clean
point cloud and the entire adversarial point cloud. This
was explored for 2D images by [9] and [12]. We do
this by normalizing each dimension’s perturbation by
the L2 norm of the perturbation for all dimensions.
This allows the individual perturbations to have diverse
magnitudes and directions. We refer to this as the ”gra-
dient L2 method”, and it is formally defined as
xadv = x+ ǫ
∆xJ(f(x; θ), y)
||∆xJ(f(x; θ), y)||2
(4)
Our preliminary tests have shown little difference be-
tween the iterative attack success rates of all three methods.
However, in terms of perceptibility, each attack variation af-
fects the point cloud differently. Constraining the L∞ norm
of the perturbation severely limits the number of perturba-
tion directions in 3D space due to the sign operation. By al-
lowing various perturbation magnitudes and directions with
(a) Original car (b) Fast gradient L2, predicted
as bookshelf.
(c) Iter. gradient L2, predicted
as range hood.
(d) Iter. gradient L2 and clip-
ping norms, predicted as range
hood.
(e) Iter. gradient L2 and gra-
dient proj., predicted as range
hood.
(f) Normalized fast gradient
L2, predicted as bookshelf.
(g) Normalized iter. gradient
L2, predicted as range hood.
Figure 1: A set of successful adversarial perturbations on the point cloud of a car, generated from PointNet trained with the
ModelNet-Unique dataset. Orange points have nonzero perturbations.
the gradientL2 method, the attack can create outliers by as-
signing higher perturbations to input features with high gra-
dients and allow the points that have lower gradients to be
perturbed less. Normalized gradient L2 allows more avail-
able perturbation directions for each point, but it does not
generate outliers. We will mainly consider the latter two
variations in our evaluations, as the first method is much
more restricted regarding how each point can be perturbed.
3.4. Jacobian-based saliency map (JSMA)
As all of the aforementioned attacks act on all points
within each point cloud, we also evaluate a different ap-
proach that selects a subset of points to perturb instead
of perturbing all of the points. More specifically, we use
a slightly modified version of the Jacobian-based saliency
method [14] for 3D points. The original paper describes a
targeted attack that is constrained by the L0 norm. I.e., the
attack seeks to minimize the number of input dimensions
perturbed. We use an untargeted variant of the original at-
tack.
Instead of selecting single dimensions to perturb, we ag-
gregate the gradients for all three dimensions of each point
and perturb them all. Furthermore, we allow dimensions to
either increase or decrease in value depending on its gradi-
ents, which increases the number of candidate points that
can be chosen to be perturbed. To craft the adversarial at-
tack, we obtain the saliency s(p) for each point p through
gy(p) =
∂fy(x; θ)
∂p
go(p) =
∑
i6=y
∂fi(x; θ)
∂p
(5)
s(p) =


0 if gy(p), go(p) < 0
or gy(p), go(p) > 0∑
(|gy(p)| ⊙ |go(p)|) otherwise
(6)
where the ⊙ symbol denotes element-wise multiplication.
We let the attack run for a fixed number of iterations, and
for each iteration, the point with the highest total saliency
across all dimensions is chosen. Then, each dimension of
the chosen point’s position is either increased or decreased
by some ǫ according to whether gy(p) < go(p) or gy(p) >
go(p), respectively.
3.5. Other approaches
One main problem with using adversarial attacks in 3D
space is that, unlike 2D space, the perturbations are more
perceptible due to obvious outliers that change the overall
shapes of the point clouds. As such, in addition to those
basic attacks, we also propose methods that reduce the per-
ceptibility of those attacks.
(a) Original person (b) Fast gradient L2, predicted
as plant.
(c) Iter. gradient L2, predicted
as plant.
(d) Iter. gradient L2 and clip-
ping norms, predicted as plant.
(e) Iter. gradient L2 and gradi-
ent proj., predicted as plant.
(f) Normalized fast gradient
L2, predicted as plant.
(g) Normalized iter. gradient
L2, predicted as plant.
Figure 2: A set of successful adversarial perturbations on the point cloud of a person, generated from PointNet trained with
the ModelNet-Unique dataset. Orange points have nonzero perturbations.
Gradient projection. In this method, perturbations are
projected onto the surface of an object, which is made up
of a mesh of triangles. First, each adversarially perturbed
point padv is projected onto the plane represented by the
triangle that point was sampled from:
padvproj = p
adv − ~n[~n · (padv − t1)] (7)
where t1 is a vertex of the triangle, ~n is the unit normal vec-
tor of the plane, and · represents the dot product operation.
Then, each perturbed point that leaves its corresponding
triangle’s edges is clipped to the edges of that triangle.
This method shows that we can generate adversarial at-
tacks of a point cloud by simply changing the sampling den-
sity. It generates adversarial examples that have the same
general shape as the clean data, which makes the perturba-
tions much less perceptible. It also allows us to measure
how well the networks perform against changes in the dis-
tribution of points on an object’s surface.
Clipping norms. A more practical way to lower the
perceptibility of attacks (without requiring the triangular
meshes of the point clouds) is to clip the L2 norms of the
perturbation of each point in order to match the average
pairwise euclidean distances between nearby points in the
clean sample. This limits large, outlying perturbations that
may occur in one of the basic attacks.
To clip the L2 norm, we use the following method for
each point:
padvclip = p+
padv − p
||padv − p||2
( 1
N
∑
p′∈x
||p′ −NN(p′)||2
)
(8)
where NN(·) returns the nearest neighboring point, and N
is the number of points in x. This attempts to maintain
the distribution of distances between points in the perturbed
sample to match that of the clean sample.
4. Defenses
We evaluate the performance of several simple defensive
techniques in response to the adversarial attacks. In addi-
tion to evaluating adversarial training, we also propose two
different input restoration methods that try to remove per-
turbed points by making certain assumptions about clean
input point clouds.
4.1. Adversarial training
The adversarial training algorithm was initially proposed
by Goodfellow et al. [7]. We train each model from scratch
by generating fast gradient L2 adversarial examples at each
iteration and averaging the loss from feeding in batches of
None Adversarial training Removing outliers Removing salient points
None 0.0% 0.5% 2.6% 0.7%
Fast gradient L2 39.8% 7.3% 4.6% 10.2%
Iter. gradient L2 74.2% 37.1% 16.2% 19.9%
Iter. gradient L2, clip norm 45.2% 32.6% 10.9% 14.2%
Iter. gradient L2, grad. proj. 4.3% 6.8% 2.5% 2.1%
Normalized fast gradient L2 14.1% 7.9% 9.1% 12.9%
Normalized iter. gradient L2 64.5% 59.1% 19.7% 32.2%
JSMA 40.9% 9.0% 0.5% 8.0%
Table 1: Error rates for untargeted attacks and defenses on PointNet trained with ModelNet-Unique. Each column represents
a defense method, and each row represents an attack method.
clean and adversarial examples:
Jadv(f(x; θ), y) =
1
2
[
J
(
f(x; θ), y
)
+
J
(
f(x+ ǫ
∆xJ(f(x; θ), y)
||∆xJ(f(x; θ), y)||2
; θ), y
)]
(9)
This trains the network to adjust for adversarial samples.
4.2. Input restoration
Removing outliers. Another way to defend against ad-
versarial attacks is by removing outlying points that may
be created due to adversarial perturbations. This is similar
ideas used by [27].
Outliers are identified by first examining the average eu-
clidean distance of each point to its k-nearest neighbors:
d =
{1
k
k∑
i=1
||padv−kNN(padv, i)||2
∣∣∣ padv ∈ xadv
}
(10)
where kNN(·, i) returns the i-th closest point.
Then, points that have very high average distances to its
nearest neighbors are assumed to be outliers and are dis-
carded. Each of these outlier points padv are identified by
looking at the distribution of average distances across all
points:
1
k
k∑
i=1
||padv − kNN(padv, i)||2 >
1
|d|
∑
i
di + ǫ stddev(d)
(11)
This method assumes that since each point on a natural
shape should be uniformly sampled along the surface, any
outlier point must be the result of adversarial perturbations.
Removing salient points. We also explore a defensive
technique supported by the crude assumption that perturbed
points should have relatively large magnitudes of gradients.
By assuming that this is true, an algorithm that discards the
most salient points can be used, where the saliency of each
point padv is given by
s(padv) = max
i
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
∂fi(x
adv; θ)
∂padv
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
(12)
This method may remove both unperturbed points and per-
turbed points.
5. Evaluation
5.1. Models
We evaluate both PointNet [17] and PointNet++ [18] for
their performance against the mentioned adversarial attacks
and defenses. We directly use the default hyperparame-
ters when training the networks, except for a slightly lower
batch size for PointNet++ due to limited memory.
5.2. Datasets
We use shapes from the ModelNet-40 [22] dataset to
train and evaluate the models. There are over 2400 total
models from 40 different classes in the dataset. We sample
1024 points from each shape and center and scale the data
to match the settings used by Qi et al. [17, 18] in PointNet
and PointNet++.
Since some of the classes in ModelNet-40 are quite in-
distinguishable even to humans (e.g. chair and stool), for
most experiments, we use a subset of 16 hand-picked object
classes that have more unique shapes, which allows us to
measure the effectiveness of adversarial attacks that have to
switch between very different classes. The 16 classes are:
airplane, bed, bookshelf, car, chair, cone, cup, guitar, lamp,
laptop, person, piano, plant, range hood, stairs, and table.
We will refer to this dataset as ModelNet-Unique.
5.3. Implementation details
For all attacks that constrain the L2 norm between the
clean and adversarial point clouds, we use an ǫ value of 1.
For normalized fast/iterative gradient attacks, we use an ǫ
value of 0.05. Finally, for JSMA, we use 0.5 as the ǫ value.
We also use 10 iterations for all iterative attacks, including
JSMA.
For our targeted iterative gradient L2 attacks, we use a
higher ǫ of 5, as the difficulty of generating successful ad-
versarial attacks is increased.
For our evaluations of the defensive techniques, we ad-
versarially train with perturbations generated by fast gradi-
entL2 using an ǫ value of 1. For the outlier removalmethod,
we use the mean distance to the 10 closest neighbors of each
point and we clip perturbations that exceed the mean by
1 standard deviation. We remove 100 of the most salient
points when removing salient points.
6. Results
6.1. Clean inputs
We perform all of our attacks on only the correctly clas-
sified point clouds. For PointNet and PointNet++ using the
full 40 classes, around 90% of the point clouds are correctly
classified. On ModelNet-Unique, around 96% of the point
clouds are correctly classified.
6.2. Effectiveness of white-box attacks and defenses
Success rate
Fast gradient L2 58.8%
Iter. gradient L2 90.1%
Iter. gradient L2, clip norm 77.0%
Iter. gradient L2, gradient proj. 26.0%
Normalized fast gradient L2 40.0%
Normalized iter. gradient L2 88.1%
JSMA 56.4%
Table 2: Success rates for untargeted attacks on PointNet
trained with ModelNet-40.
40 Unique
Fast gradient L2 36.5% 36.1%
Iter. gradient L2 96.4% 92.2%
Iter. gradient L2, clip norm 91.2% 70.6%
Iter. gradient L2, grad. proj. 24.5% 4.6%
Normalized fast gradient L2 31.0% 24.7%
Normalized iter. gradient L2 96.6% 91.6%
JSMA 9.8% 2.5%
Table 3: Success rates of untargeted attacks on PointNet++.
The network is trained/evaluated on both ModelNet-40 (40)
and ModelNet-Unique (Unique).
For ModelNet-Unique, the error rates for all combina-
tions of attacks and defenses on PointNet are shown in Ta-
ble 1. Results for ModelNet-40 on PointNet are shown in
Table 2. Table 3 shows the results on PointNet++, for both
ModelNet-Unique and ModelNet-40.
We also show a few visualizations of adversarial exam-
ples generated from PointNet on the ModelNet-Unique set
in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Adversarial attacks on undefended networks are ex-
tremely effective against PointNet and PointNet++. Fur-
thermore, PointNet++ has higher error rates than PointNet
for both the vanilla and the normalized versions of the it-
erative gradient L2 attack, even though it is more complex,
which suggests that higher architecture complexity does not
lead to higher robustness against adversarial attacks. How-
ever, PointNet++ shows greater resistance to JSMA, which
we think is due to how it hierarchically groups relatively
close features within epsilon balls, allowing it to ignore
large perturbations.
The defenses we evaluate are also effective. Adversarial
training halves the success rate of iterative gradient L2, and
decreases the success rates of fast gradient L2 and JSMA
by more than 4 times. However, it is much less effective
against normalized iterative gradient L2 compared to iter-
ative gradient L2. This suggests that adversarial training
does not transfer very well to perturbations that have differ-
ent distributions.
Overall, the other two simpler defenses perform even
better than adversarial training. We find that both remov-
ing outliers and removing salient points, which were con-
structed to defend against large perturbations, are also ef-
fective against attacks, like L2 norm clipping and gradient
projection, that generate small perturbations. Furthermore,
directly removing salient points does not damage the classi-
fication of clean input point clouds by too much compared
to other methods.
The best defensive method is by removing outliers, at the
expense of 2.6% lower accuracy on unperturbed inputs.
As expected, adversarial attacks are more successful on
ModelNet-40 than on ModelNet-Unique.
||xadv − x||2
Fast gradient L2 1.0
Iter. gradient L2 0.6
Iter. grad. L2, clip norm 0.4
Iter. grad. L2, grad. proj. 0.2
Normalized fast. grad L2 1.2
Normalized iter. grad L2 0.7
JSMA 2.6
Table 4: Average L2 norms of the adversarial perturbations
(||xadv−x||2) for PointNet trained with ModelNet-Unique.
Perceptibility. The iterative gradient L2 attack with gra-
dient projection is the least perceptible attack. However, It
reaches over 20% success rate on both PointNet and Point-
Net++ with the ModelNet-40 dataset, even though there are
barely any visible change to the input point clouds. Fur-
thermore, the predictions of successful adversarial attacks
are all highly confident. With higher epsilons and slightly
more noticeable perturbations, the success rate of the attack
plateaus at around 30% to 40% for both PointNet and Point-
Net++ on the ModelNet-40. The second least perceptible
attack, iterative gradient L2 with clipping norms, is much
more successful as it reaches a 45.2% attack success rate
on PointNet with the harder ModelNet-Unique dataset, and
even higher on PointNet++. This clearly indicates the vul-
nerability of those networks against adversarial attacks that
are almost imperceptible.
We show the L2 norms between the clean point clouds
and the adversarial point clouds in Table 4. This can be
seen as a way of measuring perceptibility, though it does
not account for the shapes of the point clouds.
6.3. Targeted white-box attacks
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Figure 3: A heat map of successful targeted iterative gra-
dient L2 attacks on PointNet for every pair of classes from
the ModelNet-Unique dataset. The x-axis represents the la-
bels and the y-axis represents attack target. Brighter is more
successful. Each cell represents the percentage of success-
ful attacks.
We show a heat map in Figure 3 that describes how well
targeted iterative gradient L2 attacks perform when each
clean point cloud targets every output class. Overall, the
targeted attacks are very successful, even though the dif-
ficulty level for crafting adversarial examples is increased.
The average success rate for all targeted attacks is 79.6%.
The average prediction confidence of 97.0% for successful
attacks.
6.4. Effectiveness of black-box attacks
Fast grad. L2 Iter. grad. L2
PN→ PN++ 30.6% 14.7%
PN++→ PN 29.3% 10.0%
PN adv. train→ PN 62.0% 36.0%
PN→ PN adv. train 11.8% 11.7%
Table 5: Success rates of transfer attacks between regu-
lar and adversarially trained PointNet (PN) and PointNet++
(PN++), on the ModelNet-Unique dataset. Only successful
perturbations from one network were evaluated on the other
network. I.e., each percentage represents a fraction of all
successful attacks from one model that were successful in
fooling another model.
We evaluate the effectiveness of black-box transfer at-
tacks by generating adversarial perturbations for each net-
work architecture and testing them on the other network.
Our results are shown in Table 5.
Our results are consistent with the results for black-box
attacks on 2D images [9], as fast gradient L2 performs bet-
ter than iterative gradientL2. This was determined by [9] to
be due to iterative gradient L2 attacks overfitting the model
it was crafted for.
Adversarially trained PointNet shows resistance to ad-
versarial perturbations generated from a normally trained
PointNet architecture. Also, attacks that can fool an adver-
sarially trained PointNet have a larger success rate on fool-
ing an undefended PointNet1. These results are expected,
and they show that adversarial training is robust to simple
transfer attacks from the same model architecture.
7. Discussion
PointNet and PointNet++ have been shown to be robust
against point clouds of varying densities and randomly per-
turbed point clouds [17, 18]. However, against our adversar-
ial attacks that preserve the overall shape of the input point
clouds, the networks perform very poorly. This indicates
a fundamental problem with the decision boundaries that
PointNet and PointNet++ learn. The latent representations
1Note that success rate of fast gradient L2 transferring from PointNet
with adversarial training to the undefended PointNet is slightly statistically
insignificant, as less than 100 adversarial examples successfully fooled an
adversarially trained PointNet
of input point clouds must be close to the decision bound-
aries if they can easily cross it with small perturbations.
Our defenses attempts to lessen the problem. Adversar-
ial training forces the decision boundaries to adjust for ad-
versarial perturbations, leaving adequate space between the
clean sample and the decision boundary [11]. Removing
outliers does not directly affect a network’s learned param-
eters, but it moves the input data away from the decision
boundaries by enforcing certain distributions for the input
data. I.e., it restores the point clouds to a state where each
point is relatively close to its neighbors, which should be
true for clean point clouds that were uniformly sampled
from 3D meshes. Removing salient points attempts to drop
points that may significantly affect the network’s prediction,
which also moves the point clouds away from the decision
boundaries.
The max-pooling operations in PointNet and PointNet++
hide a subset of points from attacks that require gradient in-
formation. The attacks cannot perturb those hidden points
because they have zero gradients due to not being selected
by the max-pooling operation. As outliers and salient points
are removed, points that were previously hidden by the
max-pooling operation are exposed and they can represent
the overall shape of the point clouds, allowing the networks
to make accurate predictions.
The existence of certain priors in the distribution of un-
perturbed points, the hiding of points by the max-pooling
operation, and the ability to directly drop points that may be
perturbed without disturbing the overall shapes of the point
clouds allow 3D point clouds and 3D point cloud networks
to be inherently more robust against adversarial attacks than
2D images and 2D convolutional networks.
We think that our outlier removal method provides a nec-
essary upper bound for future evaluations of adversarial at-
tacks in 3D space, as unlike image pixels, each point can
be perturbed by an arbitrary amount. Removing very ob-
vious outliers is necessary to prevent attacks on 3D point
clouds that may create effective, but unrealistic changes to
the input data.
8. Conclusion
We conduct a preliminary examination on adversarial at-
tacks and defenses on 3D point clouds point cloud classi-
fiers, like PointNet [17] and PointNet++ [18]. We show that
many methods used on 2D images are also effective on 3D
point clouds. In addition, we propose various methods to
reduce the perceptibility of adversarial perturbations while
remaining relatively effective, and we examine simple de-
fenses that exploit the nature of the 3D point cloud data.
Overall, we find that although deep 3D point cloud clas-
sifiers are still susceptible to simple gradient-based adver-
sarial attacks, they are more easily defensible compared to
2D image classifiers.
As deep neural networks are applied to various problems,
the significance of adversarial examples grows. We hope
that our work can provide a foundation for further research
into understanding network behavior in an adversarial set-
ting, and improving the robustness of neural networks that
handle 3D data in safety-critical applications.
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